Twenty people, fourteen systems
On January 20, 2025, the Office of Personnel Management began granting individuals associated with the Department of Government Efficiency access to federal personnel systems. The systems held personal information belonging to tens of millions of current, former, and prospective federal employees. That includes veterans, who accounted for more than a quarter of the federal executive-branch workforce in fiscal year 2024, according to OPM.
By March 6, according to an OPM audit, twenty DOGE-related individuals had received access to OPM systems. Nearly all of that access was administrative. At least fourteen systems were involved, most containing personally identifiable information.
Many received access before completing required privacy and security training. Others were granted administrative privileges despite having no demonstrated need for them. Internal OPM emails also showed that career database administrators had their access revoked on January 20 or shortly afterward.
Few of the DOGE-related individuals ever logged into the systems to which they had been granted administrative access. That distinction would become central to the case.
On October 20, 2026, U.S. District Judge Denise Cote ruled that OPM's actions violated the Privacy Act of 1974. The agency had granted access without establishing that the individuals needed the information to perform their duties. It had also bypassed its established security safeguards.
The court did not find that DOGE personnel had stolen the records or publicly disclosed them. It found that OPM had unlawfully granted access to protected information, regardless of whether every individual used those permissions.
That is a different kind of privacy failure.
The law was already there
The Privacy Act governs how federal agencies collect, maintain, use, and disclose records about individuals.
Under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1), an agency may disclose protected records internally to its officers and employees who need them to perform their duties. The provision does not authorize access simply because someone works for the government, holds a senior position, or participates in a presidential initiative.
The statute also requires agencies to establish appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to protect personal information.
These requirements are not new. Neither are the security principles behind them.
Least privilege means giving a user only the permissions necessary to perform an assigned function. Need-to-know means that access must be justified by the work being performed. Both principles are fundamental to managing sensitive government information.
OPM had policies addressing these requirements. The court found that the agency failed to follow them.
One explanation offered for the broad access was that DOGE personnel might need the information later. OPM officials described granting permissions in anticipation of future work.
The court rejected that justification. A possible future need does not establish a present need under the Privacy Act.
That conclusion is particularly significant because OPM's own chief information officer had testified that access requests could be fulfilled within minutes. The agency did not need to distribute broad privileges in advance to avoid delaying legitimate work.
The authorization process was available.
An executive order is not an exemption
The administration had a legitimate interest in examining federal operations, improving efficiency, and modernizing government information systems.
President Trump's January 2025 executive order directed agencies to provide the U.S. DOGE Service with broad access to unclassified records and information systems.
But the order contained an important qualification. Access was to be provided to the maximum extent consistent with law. It also required adherence to rigorous data protection standards.
Those limitations were not incidental. An executive order cannot simply displace statutory protections governing federal records.
The government's position relied in part on the breadth of DOGE's mission and the need to prepare personnel for work across agency systems. The court found that neither supplied the justification required by the Privacy Act.
Modernizing a database may require access to its architecture, configuration, software, and operational processes. It does not automatically require access to every person's information stored inside it.
That distinction is familiar in cyber operations. Administrators can maintain systems through carefully scoped privileges, test environments, controlled queries, and documented approvals. The precise method depends on the task, but the obligation to justify access remains.
The authority to improve a system is not the same as authority to examine its contents.
What the investigation did not find
There is an important limitation to the court's findings.
OPM conducted an internal investigation between May 18 and June 5, 2026. According to a declaration from its chief information officer, the review examined audit, access, and provisioning logs; accounts and credentials; data-loss-prevention, egress, and export logs for indications of copying or transmission outside OPM systems; and account status.
The review reported no evidence that DOGE personnel had exported, copied, transferred, or transmitted the plaintiffs' personal information outside OPM systems. It also reported no evidence that relevant datasets had been extracted and provided outside authorized OPM environments.
Those findings deserve acknowledgment.
But the court's record also documented indirect access. Career OPM employees extracted government email addresses and employee names to create a government-wide email service and made that information available to DOGE personnel. Separately, OPM's former chief information officer testified that career staff may have extracted information for a retirement services modernization project.
These findings are not necessarily contradictory. The investigation's no-evidence finding concerned data leaving OPM systems. The indirect access the court described happened inside OPM, through career employees.
The Privacy Act does not require proof of an external data breach before its disclosure restrictions and safeguard requirements apply. Granting unauthorized access to protected records can itself violate the statute.
An organization can maintain functioning security systems, retain audit logs, and find no evidence of exfiltration while still failing to protect the information entrusted to it.
The failure can occur at the moment access is approved.
The controls came afterward
OPM has since changed its procedures.
The agency revised its privacy and security policies to require documented justification, verification of training, appropriate personnel vetting, and written approval before granting access to systems containing protected information.
The revised procedures also address indirect access. An individual cannot avoid the need-to-know requirement simply by asking an authorized employee to retrieve information on their behalf.
OPM has withdrawn the disputed access permissions. According to the court's October ruling, no DOGE-associated individual had retained access to OPM systems containing protected personal information since September 2025.
The temporary DOGE organization ended operations on July 4, 2026, as contemplated by the original executive order.
These developments are meaningful. The court recognized them.
But Judge Cote declined to dismiss the case as moot. She noted that OPM's policy changes and removal of permissions frequently occurred shortly before litigation deadlines. The agency had also continued to maintain that the DOGE personnel needed the access.
The court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment on their Administrative Procedure Act claims because OPM's actions violated the Privacy Act. It rejected a separate claim that the DOGE defendants had acted beyond their legal authority under a nonstatutory theory.
The termination of the temporary DOGE organization does not eliminate the possibility of recurrence. The U.S. DOGE Service continues to operate, and the executive order's access directive remains in effect. The court found that the temporary organization's termination narrowed the circumstances in which the challenged conduct could recur but did not eliminate them.
The court left the question of additional remedies for a later decision.
Access is a decision
Government information systems depend on delegated authority. Administrators grant permissions, supervisors approve requests, and security personnel implement controls.
Those arrangements work only when the people making access decisions apply the rules governing the information.
The court made that point directly. It attributed the violation to the failure of particular individuals to follow the Privacy Act and honor OPM's safeguards, not to deficient procedures or unclear law.
That finding raises a broader issue.
Security controls are often evaluated by whether they prevent unauthorized users from entering a system. This case presents a different problem. The permissions were granted by officials who had the ability to authorize them. The failure was in the decision itself.
An audit may detect an unauthorized login or suspicious data transfer. It may not flag excessive permissions when those permissions were granted through an established approval process and the audit does not independently examine whether the underlying authorization was justified.
OPM's revised procedures may reduce that risk. But written approvals, training requirements, and access policies still depend on the people responsible for enforcing them.
This distinction extends beyond OPM or DOGE.
Any agency undertaking a major technology initiative faces pressure to move quickly. New personnel need accounts. Contractors need access. Leadership wants results. Broad permissions can appear to be the simplest way to remove operational obstacles.
But convenience is not a legal basis for disclosure.
The Privacy Act places limits on what government officials may do with information entrusted to their agencies. Those limits apply even when the intended work serves a legitimate public purpose.
The October ruling establishes that OPM crossed those limits. The remaining proceedings will determine whether additional remedies are warranted.
A valid account establishes that a system will recognize a user. Administrative privileges establish what the system will allow that user to do. Neither establishes that the user has legal authority to access a particular record.
The government can give someone the keys. That does not mean the law gives them permission to open every door.
Sources: American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, No. 1:25-cv-01237, Opinion and Order (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 20, 2026); Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, particularly § 552a(b)(1) and § 552a(e)(10); Executive Order 14158, Establishing and Implementing the President's Department of Government Efficiency (Jan. 20, 2025); AFGE v. OPM, preliminary injunction opinion (June 9, 2025), and subsequent court orders; Electronic Frontier Foundation, AFGE v. OPM litigation archive, including OPM declarations and administrative records concerning access controls and the 2026 internal investigation; Pew Research Center, How many U.S. military veterans work for the federal government?; U.S. Office of Personnel Management, FY2022 Veteran Employment Report.